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Résumé   
 
Dans les dernières décennies, la mer d’Aral, située en Asie centrale à proximité de 
la frontière entre le Kazakhstan et l’Ouzbékistan, a connu un dessèchement 
dramatique qui a été divulgué dans la presse. Cette catastrophe environnementale, 
rebaptisée la “Crise de la mer d’Aral”, est due à la base au détournement artificiel 
des fleuves du bassin pendant la période soviétique dans le but d’irriguer de 
nouveaux champs de coton. De nos jours, malgré la réalisation de différents projets 
de réhabilitation environnemental et d’une riche littérature scientifique à ce sujet, le 
bilan général concernant la mer d’Aral, et en particulier pour ce qui concerne sa 
rive ouzbèke, est encore critique. Cet article, après une synthèse sur les causes et 
les conséquences du désastre écologique, analyse les implications géopolitiques 
liées à la détérioration de la qualité de l’environnement dans la région et à la 
gestion des eaux en Asie centrale post-soviétique, en soulignant, dans le cas de la 
mer d’Aral, les criticités liées à la transition rapide de bassin interne à un état de 
bassin international. Dernièrement, sont remis en question les anciens programmes 
et les nouveaux projets centre-asiatiques concernant la gestion des eaux. 
Mots-clés: Crise de la mer d’Aral; gestion des ressources hydriques 
transfrontalières; dévellopement durable; politiques environnementales.  
 
Summary 
 
In the last decades the Aral Sea, located in Central Asia on the boundary between 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, experienced a dramatic shrinking, divulged even in 
newspapers and magazines. Such an ecological catastrophe, renamed the “Aral Sea 
Crisis”, was triggered by the artificial diversion of the rivers of the basin during the 
Soviet period, in order to irrigate new cotton fields. Nowadays, notwithstanding the 
fulfilment of several environmental restoration projects and a wide scientific 
literature about the process, the general balance about the water body, in particular 
its Uzbek side, is still critical. This paper, after a synthesis concerning the causes 
and the consequences of the ecological disaster, analyses the geopolitical 
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implications connected to the deterioration of the environmental quality in the 
region and to water management in Post-Soviet Central Asia, underlining, in the 
case of the Aral Sea Basin, the criticities linked to its fast transition from an 
internal basin to an international one. Finally, Central Asian water-related old 
programs and future scenarios are discussed. 
Keywords: Aral Sea Crisis; Transboundary Water Resources Management; 
Sustainable Development; Environmental Policies. 
 
Riassunto 
 
Negli ultimi decenni il lago d’Aral, posto in Asia centrale presso il confine tra 
Kazakistan ed Uzbekistan, ha sperimentato un disseccamento drammatico, 
divulgato persino dai quotidiani e dalle riviste illustrate. Tale catastrofe ecologica, 
ribattezzata la “Crisi del lago d’Aral”, è stata innescata dalla diversione artificiale 
dei fiumi del bacino durante il periodo sovietico, allo scopo di irrigare nuovi campi 
di cotone. Ai nostri giorni, nonostante la realizzazione di diversi progetti di 
ripristino ambientale ed un’ampia letteratura scientifica circa questo processo, il 
bilancio generale riguardante il corpo d’acqua, specialmente per quel che concerne 
la sua sponda uzbeka, è tuttora critico. Questo articolo, dopo una sintesi relativa 
alle cause ed alle conseguenze del disastro ecologico, analizza le implicazioni 
geopolitiche connesse al deterioramento della qualità ambientale nella regione e 
alla gestione delle acque nell’Asia centrale post-sovietica, sottolineando, nel caso 
del lago d’Aral, le criticità collegate alla rapida transizione da bacino interno ad 
uno stato a bacino internazionale. Da ultimo, sono discussi i vecchi programmi e i 
futuri scenari centro-asiatici inerenti le acque. 
Parole-chiave: Crisi del lago d’Aral; Gestione delle risorse idriche 
transfrontaliere; Sviluppo sostenibile; Politiche ambientali. 
 
Introduction  
 
Nowadays, the Aral Sea shrinking (in the scientific literature renamed the “Aral 
Sea Crisis”) represents a sort of symbol, assimilable to an admonishment: after its 
acknowledgement as the «worst ecological disaster in the 20th century» 
(FESHBACH, FRIENDLY, 1992) and an emblematic example of over-exploitation of 
water resources (GORE, 2006), scientific community, educational system and 
ecological movements identified in it a paradigmatic case of unsustainable 
development.  
Notwithstanding a global awareness about the causes and the consequences of the 
process, Aral Sea criticities have not been solved. This paper, skipping ecological, 
hydrological and technical issues, focuses its attention to the geopolitical 
dimension of the Aral Sea Crisis, emphasizing the limits and the potential conflicts 
related to nowadays Central Asian Republics self-referring hydropolitics, which 
coincides with an old Uzbek proverb: «It is rich not the land owner, but the water 
one». 
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The Aral Sea holds a strong impact on the regional landscape, being Central Asia 
an almost completely arid territory, normally characterized by sandy deserts 
(Kyzylkum, Karakum) or steppe biome. Located in the middle of the Turolian 
lowland between 30 and 40 m a.s.l., it receives water resources from an endorheic 
basin. This definition applies when, because of the orography, rivers and streams 
do not flow in seas or oceans, forming on the contrary inland water bodies. The 
Aral Sea Basin (fig. 1) is considerably wide, reaching 1.8 million km2 and 
involving Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan (until 
1991 included in the USSR), Afghanistan and minoritily Iran and Popular Republic 
of China. In this basin, Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya are the main rivers, draining the 
most of the superficial waters: in both cases they are exotic watercourses, 
conveying downstream sources-originated waters, and not receiving considerable 
contributions from tributaries. 
The Amu-Darya river (Oxus in Ancient Greek and Latin literature) originates from 
Pamir Chain, after the confluence of Pyanj (Afghanistan) and Vakhsh (Tajikistan) 
rivers. Its total length  exceeds 2400 km, and, thanks to 70 km3 annual discharge, it 
can be considered as the Central Asian biggest river (GLANTZ, 2005). The Amu-
Darya règime is strongly irregular, influenced by seasonal meltings of Afghan and 
Tajik glaciers; its muddy waters are very rich in silt. 
The Syr-Darya river (Iaxartes in the Antiquity), 2300 km long, originates from 
Tien Shan mountains in Kyrgyzstan, crosses Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and finally 
reaches Kazakhstan, where flows through a delta in the Aral Sea. Analogously to 
Amu-Darya, also Syr-Darya river holds an irregular règime, but its annual 
discharge is lesser than the first one. 
In the 20th century, the ’50s meant for the USSR a u-turn in the economical field. 
Ceased the Stalin Era, the Soviet Union, under the guide of Nikita Kruscev, 
launched a new ambitious agrarian project in Central Asia: the quinquennial plan 
and several CPSU resolutions ratified, in the central part of the Aral Sea Basin, the 
development of cotton cultivation, trying to reach the self-sufficiency about this 
sector and become the first cotton producer in the world, exceeding the USA 
(ZONN, 1999). The official reasons of such an initiative were economical and 
agrarian, but behind this operation there were also propaganda reasons within the 
Cold War: the USSR intended to demonstrate the superiority of the Socialist model 
in comparison with the Capitalist one. Moreover, the giantism of this program is 
connected with Soviet Union environmental policies, based on a concept of mere 
exploitation of natural resources, considered virtually inexhaustible and without 
intrinsic values, paradoxically similar to the theories of the contemporary 
capitalistic neoclassical economists (ZIEGLER, 1987). Consequently, most of 
Uzbekistan and part of Southern Kazakhstan (at that time Republics included in the 
USSR) were reconverted into a cotton monocolture, collectively driven through the 
creation of Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz: Kolkhoz were smaller and quite similar to 
cooperative enterprises; Sovkhoz were governmental companies, extended in the 
order of thousands hectares, hierarchically managed by Soviet agronomists.  
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New cotton fields were irrigated thanks to a myriad of irrigation channels, 
diverting great water volumes from Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya. The cotton 
production of Soviet Central Asia grew sensibly, but it never exceed the American 
one. Unfortunately, this project had a terrible impact on the environment in general 
and on the hydrological balance in particular. 
Starting from the ’60s of the 20th century, a decade after the beginning of 
Kruscev’s new agrarian approach in Central Asia, the consequences of this 
program, at first weakly, then brutally, arose. Deprived of the water contribution of 
its tributaries, the Aral Sea started a fast regression, because the inflow of the Amu-
Darya and Syr-Darya rivers could not balance the evaporation. This shrinking did 
not shock Soviet technicians; on the contrary, as a logic result of the increase of the 
irrigated area, they had forecasted this process, defining it as a «necessary 
sacrifice» for the growth of the Nation (RUMER, 1989). In the last 40-45 years the 
sea level shrank for more than 20 meters; the area and the water volume decreased 
of 75% and 90% respectively (fig. 2). This process, hidden for a long time by 
Soviet authorities and spread to the world community only between the ’80s and 
the ’90s (MICKLIN, 1988; ELLIS, 1990;  REZNICHENKO, 1992), was so intense that 
in 1989-1990 the Aral Sea divided into two separated water bodies: the Small Aral 
Sea (also called North Aral Sea), fed by the Syr-Darya river and entirely settled in 
Kazakhstan, and the Large Aral Sea (also called South Aral Sea), fed by the Amu-
Darya river and shared between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, at that time Republics 
of the Soviet Union. 
The Aral Sea fast regressive trend caused a long series of environmental problems. 
Because of the reduction of the sea level, water salinity grew enormously, passing 
from 10 g/l to 160 g/l nowadays verifiable in some areas, changing most of the 
Aral from a brackish basin to a hyperaline one. This transition produced serious 
repercussions from an ecological point of view, inducing at first the extinction of 
local ichthyofauna, artificially replaced by exotic species; then a reduction in 
number of the last ones. The Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya deltas have undergone an 
involution from wetlands to arid zones; in the so-called Priaralye (Aral Sea 
region), groundwater table sank, contributing to soil salinization and 
desertification. The Aral Sea shrinking also triggered climate change on a regional 
scale: without the mitigation of the water body, the climate accentuated its 
continental characteristics, suffering hotter and drier summers and colder winters 
than usual. Moreover, whereas the Aral Sea disappeared, the dried bottom of the 
water body, made up of saline deposits and pollutants collected by the rivers of the 
basin, is now exposed to wind erosion, causing health problems (in particular 
cancers) to local communities. Last but not least, the regressive trend nearly caused 
a further splitting of Large Aral into a Western Large Aral and a Eastern Large 
Aral (Glantz, 2007). 
 
Discussion 
 
The Aral Sea tragedy presents a geopolitical dimension related to water 
management in its basin. 
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During Soviet times, regarding water resources, the five Central Asian Republics 
included in the USSR (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan) were part of an integrated system which carried out a top-down basin 
solidarity. Jointly to Kruscev program of development of cotton cultivation, 
beginning from the ’50s Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the uspstream Republics along 
the courses of the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya, became the “water reservoirs” of 
Soviet Central Asia: in those years, several dams were built on these rivers, in 
order to store large water volumes during winter months, and to assign them, in 
summer months, to irrigation of downstream cotton fields in Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The main dams built during Soviet Era were Nurek 
(Tajikistan), on Vakhsh river (tributary of Amu-Darya), still today the tallest dam 
in the world (300 m), and Toktogul (Kyrgyzstan), on Naryn river, tributary of Syr-
Darya. In exchange for water storing and non-use of water resources during winters 
for hydropower, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan received from Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan free supplies of coal, natural gas and oil, utilized for 
civil heating (Sievers, 2002; Kemelova, Zhalkubaev, 2003). In Soviet times, 
Kyrgyz and Tajik water volumes were also used to develop cotton cultivation in 
the Turkmen part of the Aral Sea Basin thanks to Karakum canal (former Lenin 
canal). This hydraulic infrastructure was begun in 1954 under Stalin will, diverting 
waters from Amu-Darya and conveying them, across Karakum desert, as far as the 
Caspian region. It is the longest channel in the world (1370 km), distintive for its 
low efficiency in water transportation due to its sandy bed and to the absence of 
concrete banks. 
The disgregation of the USSR and the independence of the five Central Asia 
Republics (1991) caused the collapse of such a system: suddenly, water 
management in Central Asia, a basic theme for a arid and semi-arid region, from 
internal matter of Soviet Union became an international matter among newly 
independent Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
Russia took no interest in this affair, while every single Central Asia Republic, 
getting into line with growing nationalism fed by old Soviet Nomenklatura, now 
Republican ruling class (Carney & Moran, 2000), chose a self-referring 
hydropolitics, producing a potentially conflictual situation on a regional scale 
(Bedford, 1996; Elhance, 1997; Wegerich, 2001; Spoor, Krutov, 2003). 
Since the independence, because of the cessation of Turkmen, Kazakh and Uzbek 
fossil fuel free supplies, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan decided, during the winter 
season, to open the locks and let waters flow downstream to produce hydropower. 
New dams were also projected or are nowadays under construction: the most 
important of them is Rogun dam, located in Tajikistan on Vakhsh river just 
upstream the Nurek one, not finished yet (Wegerich, 2008). As a direct 
consequence of lack of water-storing during winter, in the last years Turkmen, 
Kazakh and Uzbek cotton fields suffered an irregular irrigation during summer, 
decreasing their productivity and cotton quality. 
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Furthermore, every Central Asian Republic presents specific problems related to 
water management in the basin: the Aral Sea Crisis can be virtually considered as 
the result of the addition of these criticities. 
Turkmenistan enlarged irrigated area and continued to develop cotton sector, 
increasing water derivations from Amu-Darya river through the Karakum canal 
(Hannan, O’Hara, 1998; O’Hara, Hannan, 1999). Former Turkmen President 
Niyazov, died in 2006, coherently with his authoritative-theocratic internal policy, 
encouraged the realization of a large artificial basin in the middle of Karakum 
desert, pompously called the “Golden Century Lake” (Badykova, 2005). In case 
this basin will be finished in the future, it will imply further water diversions from 
Amu-Darya river, but, until today, Turkmen President Berdymukhamedov, 
Niyazov’s successor, has not taken yet an official decision about the continuation 
of “Golden Century Lake” project. 
Kazakhstan, leaded by President Nazarbayev, thanks to its fossil fuel-pulled 
economy, re-organized its agricultural system, reducing the irrigated area and 
improving the channels efficiency. Water derivations from Syr-Darya were 
reduced, and the river returned to inflow into the Small Aral Sea, entirely located in 
Kazakhstan. Kazakh Government also encouraged the construction of a dam in the 
Berg Strait, with the aim to prevent water exchange from Small to Large Aral Sea, 
and to keep Syr-Darya water inflow only in the first water body. Beginning from 
the ’90s, Small Aral Sea level arose of several meters; salinity passed from 30 g/l 
in 1990, to 17-18 g/l in 2002, to 12 g/l in 2006. These conditions allowed the return 
of ichthyofauna (fresh and brackish water species): in the case of Small Aral, in the 
last 15 years the ecological restoration had a strong impact on social and economic 
fields, permitting, mainly thanks to Danish financial and technical support, the 
recovery of fishing industry, previously ceased. But, besides strong points, this 
process presents also weak points: from one side the dam on Berg Strait improved 
water quality in the Small Aral, but from the other one it condemned the Large 
Aral to a further worsening of its ecological situation. 
Uzbekistan, leaded by President Karimov, is facing the crisis of the most 
problematical water body, the Large Aral, which Kazakhstan completely neglected, 
focusing its attentions and funds only to Small Aral. Moreover, Uzbekistan has got 
less fossil fuel than Kazakhstan, and, notwithstanding the recent agrarian reform 
and decollectivization, presents a cotton-based economy, which cannot afford a 
sudden reconversion to other less water-needing cultivations. Nowadays, water 
derivations from the lower course of Amu-Darya continue, and the situation of 
Uzbek Large Aral Sea can be considered dramatic: Moynaq, once one of the most 
important port on the water body, is now located more than 40 km far from the 
shores, and the fishing industry is here completely cancelled. Finally, 
Karakalpakstan, region located on the Southern shores of Large Aral Sea and 
suffering the worst consequences of the Aral Sea Crisis, is formally organized as a 
Autonomous Republic included in Uzbekistan, and its first ethnic group is 
represented by Karakalpak people (ethnic group assimilable to Kazakhs). Recently, 
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this fact produced autonomist and secessionist political movements (HANKS, 
2000). 
In the last years, UNDP, UNEP and World Bank promoted the creation of 
international organizations, with the aim to manage the Aral Sea Crisis, solve the 
conflicts and direct Central Asian Republics towards a sustainable use of water 
resources (Carlisle, 1997; Weinthal, 2002). It dates to 1992 the origin of the 
Interstate Council for Addressing the Aral Sea Crisis (ICAS), formed by 25 
members designed by the five Central Asian Republics and periodically convoked 
twice a year: this organ is appointed to manage the international funds granted by 
the World Bank. On the basis of an anachronistical, Soviet-style and bureaucratic 
model, ICAS promoted the establishment of two technical commissions, an 
Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) and a Sustainable 
Development Commission (SDC), formerly Interstate Commission for Socio-
Economic Development and Scientific Technical and Ecological Cooperation 
(ICSDSTEC). Both of them meet five times a year. Beginning from 1997, ICAS 
was substituted by an International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS), fund cofinanced 
by the World Bank and the five Central Asia Republics through the allocation of 
1% of their GNP. Besides this international bodies, Basin-Valley Organizations 
(BVO), heritage of the Soviet Era, still keep their technical prerogatives on the 
Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya courses. 
Although governative and pro-governative books and journals pass positive 
judgments on these organizations (e.g. Karimov, 1999; IFAS, 2003a), an impartial 
view is forced to strike a negative balance about them. In fact, year after year they 
have become lobby bodies, more interested in sharing international funds than 
solving the Aral Sea Basin ecological problems. Regarding to this, it is emblematic 
the hypertrophic organization chart of IFAS: since 1993, 124 manager for 95 
positions (IFAS, 2003b) and an indeterminate number of technical and 
administrative employees. Ruling class’ superficiality and indifference towards the 
Aral Sea Crisis are effectively described by R. Ferguson in his accusation-book 
The Devil and the Disappearing Sea (2003): called by Uzbek government as an 
international expert, Ferguson fails his goals because of local authorities wait-and-
see policy. 
During the ’70s and the ’80s, when the Aral Sea regression had already reached an 
alarming state, Soviet technicians supposed to raise its level artificially diverting 
into it Western Siberian rivers Ob and Irtysh (fig. 3). This program, emphatically 
renamed “The Project of the Century”, hypothesized the realization of the longest 
channel in the world (2200 km long), called “Sibaral” because Siberian waters 
should have to stop the regressive trend of the Aral and re-establish the originary 
conditions (Hollis, 1978; Lipovsky, 1995). Analogously to Kruscev’s cotton 
development program in Central Asia and coherently with Soviet technocratic 
approach to Nature, it was a pharaonic project, without any environmental impact 
evaluation: if finished, it could perhaps have solved the Aral Sea Crisis, but in the 
meantime it would certainly have triggered a new ecological crisis in the Siberian 
taiga biome (Micklin, 1987a; Micklin, Bond, 1988). Thanks to the opposition of a 
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part of Soviet scientific community (Darst, 1988), and under the influence of new 
Soviet Leader Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost, in 1986 “The Project of the 
Century” was officially stopped (Micklin, 1987b). 
Around the middle of ’90s, several years after the USSR disgregation, Karimov 
and Nazarbayev, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Presidents respectively, exhumed the 
Siberian rivers diversion project to fill up the newly born Large Aral Sea, re-
proposing it to Russia. This state, even though it emphasizes the high costs and the 
environmental impact of such a work, assuming an ambiguous position until today 
has not rejected the program, perhaps with the aim, in the near future, to keep 
influence and political pressure towards Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (International 
Crisis Group, 2002). 
At now, Central Asian economical and geopolitical situation persuaded most of the 
scholars to consider an Utopia the restoration of the Aral Sea in conformity with 
the originary level. If Small Aral Sea does not present alarming criticity and it 
appears addressed to water resources sustainability, the efforts, both theorical and 
practical, are now devoted to the Large Aral Sea. Regarding to it, in the last years 
most of the scientists assert a perspective of environmental problems mitigation, 
comparing different projects and scenarios. 
The first one supposes to isolate completely and permanently the Western Large 
Aral from the Eastern Large one: the Eastern water body could keep today’s level 
or increase it thanks to surplus waters from Small Aral; the Western one, without 
any water inflow, should be condemned to total dessication. The weak points of the 
project consist in the necessity to double water inflow from Amu-Darya into 
Eastern Large Aral (Islamov, 1999), action very hard to propose to a cotton-based 
economy like the Uzbek one. Moreover, real Kazakh receptiveness to let Small 
Aral surplus waters stream into Eastern Large one should have to be officially 
investigated. 
A second supposition was drafted firstly by A.T. Salokhiddinnov and Z.M. 
Khakimov (Salokhiddinnov, Khakimov, 2004), and then re-proposed by P. Micklin 
(Micklin, 2006; Micklin, 2007): it presents the ambitious aim to conserve, through 
years, the three water bodies (fig. 4), which should have to be put in 
communication each other. In particular, Amu-Darya river should be diverted to 
West, inflowing into Western Large Aral and increasing its level up to 33 m a.s.l.; 
from here, exceeding waters could stream, thanks to gravity, through a concrete-
banked channel as far as Eastern Large Aral; analogously, the exceeding waters of 
Small Aral could be conveyed to Eastern Large one through a new channel. In this 
vision, Berg Strait must be closed. Such a project could allow to Eastern Large 
Aral Sea a transgression up to 29 m a.s.l. Similarly to the first conjecture, such a 
program does not face practical problems about the reduction of the irrigated area 
and Kazakh receptiveness to cede Small Aral Sea surplus waters to Uzbekistan. 
A third, radical, scenario, perhaps the most realistic of all, advances the hypothesis 
of a total dessication of Western and Eastern Large Aral Seas. In such a 
perspective, Aral Sea dried bottom salty deposits, now exposed to wind erosion and 
potentially dangerous for human health, must be fixed through the seeding or the 
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plantation of halophilic species (Khamzina et al. 2005). In the Amu-Darya delta, 
cotton fields residual waters could be used to flood small depressions, in order to 
transform them in fresh water artificial basins (KINDLER, 1998). Regarding to this, 
a pilot-experience consists in Sudoche lake, located about 30 km South-West of 
Moynaq: thanks to a project funded by the World Bank, between 1998 and 2003 a 
new fresh water body was created (World Bank, 1998; Schlüter et al. 2007). Its 
area is about 10 km2; the water volume about 2 km3. Sudoche lake holds strong 
natural values, because a massive wetland birds frequentation has begun; 
moreover, water low salinity permitted the introduction of ichthyofauna and, 
thanks to this, the recovery of a small fishing industry (20-30 fishermen in May 
2007; C. Cencini, & S. Piastra, field research data). The Sudoche experience 
proves that, in the Amu-Darya delta, environmental restoration projects are 
technically feasible, ecologically useful and socially and economically effective. 
But, from the other hand, it must be considered the balance between costs and 
benefits: the expensive budget needed for Sudoche lake (4 million USA $), 
demonstrates that this strategy cannot be extended on a large scale in the Amu-
Darya delta (Piastra, 2008). 
 
Conclusions 
 
As previously analysed, beginning from the ’50s of the 20th century the USSR 
encouraged in Central Asia the development of cotton cultivation, emphatically 
renamed the “White Gold”. In the Aral Sea Basin, water resources over-
exploitation caused an ecological disaster without any precedents in recent human 
history, cancelling a valuable landscape which impressed, for example, Russian 
Admiral A.I. Boutakoff, the first to explore this region in the 19th century (Piastra, 
on press). In the case of the Aral Sea, the decreases of level, area and volume 
created a splitting in three different water bodies: the Small Aral, the Western 
Large Aral and the Eastern Large Aral. The first, entirely located in Kazakhstan, at 
now seems to have entered a sustainable strategy about water resources; the second 
and the third, located on the boundary between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, show 
critical conditions. 
The international scientific community promoted several appeals to extend to the 
Aral Sea the status of UNESCO World Heritage (Glantz, Figueroa, 1997) and to 
save its Biodiversity (IUCN, 2004), but without any practical results. The key to 
solve radically the Aral Sea Crisis is economical and political, and it is related to 
decrease drasticly the irrigated area in the basin; but such a program should involve 
a total re-organization of agriculture, nowadays based on cotton, which Central 
Asian Republics, except for Kazakhstan, cannot afford. Moreover, Central Asian 
leaders have no interest to take unpopular and uneconomical decisions in a short 
period such as a reduction of cotton production or an introduction of specific taxes 
about water resources utilization to prevent their waste, because their authority is 
based on a populist and demagogical policy. 
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Under this situation, development goals supposed by UNESCO for the year 2025 
for Aral Sea Basin (ecological, social and economical significative improvements) 
(UNESCO, 2000), are unattainable. 
 
Table 1 - List of Acronyms 
 
BVO Basin-Valley Organizations 
ICAS Interstate Council for Addressing the Aral Sea Crisis 
ICSDSTEC Interstate Commission for Socio-Economic Development and Scientific 
Technical and Ecological Cooperation 
ICWC Interstate Commission for Water Coordination 
IFAS International Fund for the Aral Sea 
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature 
SDC Sustainable Development Commission 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
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